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African Studies, Europe & Africa1  
 
Abstract 
 
Why do most Europeans see ‘Africa’ as feckless victim and ‘the West’ as a 
rescue service?  How far are Africanists responsible for this misperception? 
How are you/we to see to it that the EU and G8 act on the Commission for 
Africa’s generally sound proposals?  How far can we look to our predeces-
sors for lessons in how to urge, not that Europe 'does something', but that 
Africans be allowed a better chance to help themselves?  How far might our 
own analyses of Africans’ societies, economies and polities be better 
adapted to exploring how far African agency might combat local and global 
structures of inequality, injustice, and misrule?  How best, finally, can we 
help our African academic colleagues to become sources of constructive in-
ternal criticism? 
 
Keywords 
Africa, underdevelopment, development potential, development theory, african 
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The Problem 
 
n Monday 25th May 1959, half a century ago, Iain Macleod, then Minister 
of Labour in a British Conservative government, wrote privately to his 
Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. A general election was coming.  The out-
come was uncertain.  It was also a bad time for British rule in Africa.  Eleven 
Kenyans had been clubbed to death at Hola detention camp.  They had re-
fused to do the forced labour that was designed to reclaim them from their 
‘hard core’ allegiance to the Mau Mau rebellion.  There was also a state of 
emergency in Nyasaland, now Malawi. More Africans had been killed there, 
this time by police gunfire. In a long letter on how Britain might best respond 
                                                 
1   Revised version of the Plenary Lecture given to the AEGIS conference on African Studies 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, on 30th June 2005. 
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to such imperial crises there was, for scholars, one particularly arresting sen-
tence.  Looking forward to the election, Macleod wrote:  
 ‘Black Africa remains perhaps our most difficult problem so far as rela-
tionships with the vital middle voters is [sic] concerned.  It is the only one in 
which our policies are under severe criticism and for example the only one on 
which we are regularly defeated at the universities. ‘Indeed the universities 
feel more strongly on this issue than on any other single matter.’2 
 Imagine, British universities then felt more strongly about Africa than 
about academic salaries or levels of state funding!  To have been an Africanist 
at that time must have been very heaven.  The pity of it of course was that 
there were very few of us, mostly linguists, anthropologists, medical experts, 
agricultural and veterinary scientists. The Journal of African History and Cahiers 
d'Etudes Africaines, brave trumpeters of a seemingly new field of scholarship, 
started only in the following year, the ‘year of Africa’, 1960.  So the strength of 
University feeling must have reflected a general sense of political obligation 
to Africa among Britain’s middle classes.  There was also a widespread per-
ception that Africans were now a political force to be reckoned with.  They 
had to be heard.  University audiences were electrified by the African leaders 
who jetted into London to negotiate the terms of their independence.  I can 
remember when Tom Mboya held Cambridge students spellbound for over 
an hour.  Press cartoons portrayed Africans, not as starving children or ema-
ciated victims of HIV-AIDS, but as virile nationalist giants, overshadowing 
puny British politicians.  The press could also accuse ministers of ruining 
Britain’s good name in Africa by reason of their cowardice or folly. 3  The 
same must have been true in France and Belgium—but not of course in Spain 
or Portugal, at that time dictatorships not only in Africa but also at home. 
 Africa has changed since then.  So too has Europe.  Fifty years ago Euro-
pean electorates felt they had responsibilities towards Africa.  Africans were 
their colonial subjects.  Africans were also demanding responsibility for them-
selves.  European publics listened.  They knew the names of African leaders: 
Leopold Senghor, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, 
Julius Nyerere, Zik.  One of the leaders of Mediterranean Africa, Gamel Ab-
dul Nasser, had recently humiliated both France and Britain in the ‘Suez’ fi-
asco.  Had European publics been more ignorant, Macleod would have been 
less worried.  It was a time of hope for Africa and Africans, perhaps of unreal-
istic expectations.  The world expected Africans to use their energetic new 
                                                 
2   Macleod to Macmillan, 25 May 1959: The National Archives/Public Record Office (Kew): 
PREM.11/2583.  Emphasis added. 
3   Joanna Lewis, ‘”Daddy wouldn’t buy me a Mau Mau”: The British Popular Press & the 
Demoralization of Empire’, chapter 10 in Atieno Odhiambo and John Lonsdale (eds.), Mau 
Mau and Nationhood: Arms, Authority and Narration (Oxford, Nairobi & Athens OH: Currey, 
EAEP & Ohio University Press, 2003), 245, 238. 
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sovereignties to slay the dragons of poverty, ignorance and disease.  Some Af-
rican leaders took up the challenge by adopting the slogan ‘Freedom and 
Work’. 
 And now? Which minister would warn his Prime Minister or Chancellor, 
Rasmussen, Balkenende, or de Villepin, Schröder, Zapatero, Berlusconi, or 
even Blair—that the outcome of the next election hung on what they did or 
did not do about Africa?  How many Europeans care what Africans think?  
How much obligation do they feel towards Africans today?  My continental 
colleagues tell me that most of their compatriots feel little or none.  A few may 
hope that aid will deter African immigrants from scaling the walls of Fortress 
Europe.  Others are moved to compassion by televised scenes of famine, but 
perhaps fewer than twenty years ago.4  How far are we—scholars, students, 
presumably friends of Africa—to blame for this mix of everyday indifference 
and latent fear, tempered now and again by pity?  What can we do to repair 
our failures in representation?  Might it be to do what best serves our own 
professional interest?  (But then the Irishman George Bernard Shaw thought 
the English unsurpassed at describing self-interest as principle).  Might we 
not do best to summon up African colleagues as allies in subverting the Euro-
pean imagination?  Ought we not to try to repair the failures in African higher 
education that so diminish the African ability to speak to us as intellectual 
equals, as expert witnesses in their own cause, as full citizens of our one 
world, able to keep us spellbound? 
 How many Europeans today could name any Africans, apart from the 
bogeyman Mugabe at one extreme and the twin saints at the other, Mandela 
and Tutu?  How many less exceptional African leaders attract attention even 
when, as now, our media—and we must be grateful to them—overflow with 
African stories, prompted by the G8 conference at Gleneagles?  How many 
Europeans expect Africans to solve their own problems?  Has any newspaper 
reported how Africans themselves argue about political and social issues, as 
they do, generally with more commitment than European electorates at 
home?  Why do we need celebrities to enlist our attention?  Bob Geldof and 
Bono seem almost alone—by popular accounts—to have awoken Europe’s 
conscience to the plight of Africa.  What they have done is marvellous, and 
we should, shamefacedly, applaud them.  They have done so much more than 
we, many hundreds of European Africanists, have done. And the Nobel lau-
reate economist Amartya Sen, formerly Master of my College, tells me Geldof 
proved to be a sharp student of development economics in the telephone tu-
torials Sen gave last year at the popstar’s request.  Economics is a mystery to 
                                                 
4   I am grateful to Jean-François Bayart, Inge Brinkman, Dominique Darbon, Kurt Dohnert, 
Bodil Folke Frederiksen and Peter Pels for their views.  My British colleagues Dave Ander-
son and Richard Waller got me started while Derek Peterson suggested a final polish. 
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too many academics as well.  But there are also dangers in this celebritisation 
of Africa’s needs, as you do not need to be told.  Two certainly:  
 One is that the sense of guilt that Geldof and Bono arouse in their audiences 
may prove, like other emotions, to be but a flash in the pan as the popular atten-
tion is caught elsewhere.  But the G8 and EU need to be subjected to intellectu-
ally sustained and politically creative scrutiny if their governments, and their 
partner governments in Africa, are to be kept to their word in the long years to 
come, if Africans are to be given another chance to help themselves, as they were 
in the 1960s. 
 The other danger was captured by the Glasgow Herald’s recent portrayal 
of Geldof as a medieval knight, a foul-mouthed Don Quixote on a white 
horse, riding across a stained-glass windowpane.5  This picture of the secular 
saint flatters the self-regarding, even racist, European image of ourselves as 
the heroic dragon-slayer, riding to the rescue of a voiceless African continent, 
helpless in the face of poverty, ignorance and disease.  Why did Geldof not 
include African singers in his Live8 concerts from the start?6  Why did the 
BBC segregate its broadcast of the African groups' performance in the 
highbrow ghetto of Radio Three?  Why is it supposed that Africans can con-
tribute so little in their own cause? 
 This is only the latest chapter in a long history of the mirror-construction 
of our two ‘racial’ identities, European and African.  This began at least two 
centuries ago, during the struggle for the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade.  
The slogan of the Quaker abolitionists, coined in 1787, just before the French 
revolution, was ‘Am I not a man and a brother?’  But the African slave into 
whose mouth this revolutionary question was placed was himself shown, on 
the Anti-Slavery Society’s seal, down on his knees before his white audience, 
not on his feet.  Four years later black slaves were very much on their feet, 
musket in hand, following Toussaint l’Ouverture in their Haitian rebellion.  
So too today the popular press—in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, to judge 
again by my colleagues’ comments—has constructed Africa as the hopeless, 
because history-less and therefore immature ‘other’, dark antipodes to the 
adult, purposeful West with its history  of struggle for civilisation.7  The occa-
sion for the resumption of this image, after the hopeful picture painted by Af-
rican nationalism, appears to have been the Nigerian civil war of the late 
1960s, when the (London) Sun called secessionist Biafra ‘the Land of No 
Hope’. The self-righteously civilising mission of the past two centuries has 
thus revived in a post-colonial age.  Parachute journalists—so different from 
                                                 
5   Thanks to my colleague Sara Dorman for drawing this to my attention.  
6   Among many press protests see, for example, Andy Kershaw, ‘Africans not included’ The 
Independent (4 June 2005), 12-13. 
7   Compare Basil Davidson, Old Africa Rediscovered  (London: Gollancz, 1964), 20-21. 
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the ‘old Africa hands’ Colin Legum or Basil Davidson of an earlier age, or 
Richard Dowden more recently—accompany sometimes equally transient 
aid-givers into what they can understand only as a tribal, lawless, starving 
Africa, from Somalia and Rwanda ten years ago, to Darfur and the Congo to-
day.8  This populist version of the civilising mission infantilises not only Afri-
cans, unable to fend for themselves, but Europeans too.  We are encouraged to 
demand, like children, the instant gratification of self-importance, a narcissis-
tic personality disorder.  We should, instead, be urged to face up to the long, 
complex, often dispiriting negotiation of critical solidarity with people who 
demand that their own views be heard.9 
 Africanist scholars should surely welcome that more arduous task.  After 
all, we study Africans as adults like ourselves, people on their feet, like our-
selves, striving to pit their human agency against human structures, whether 
political, economic, or cultural.  Are we content that the people we know as 
helpfully expert colleagues, often as lifelong friends whose children have 
played with our children, as our generous hosts, our genial drinking compan-
ions, our trustworthy informants or research assistants, our former students 
who devotedly struggle to maintain their professional, self-discipline, integ-
rity under the twin oppressions of poverty and tyranny—are we content that 
they be portrayed as helpless victims, not only on their knees but also denied 
the voice in which to ask if they are not our brothers and sisters?  And if we 
are not content, what then can we, as mere scholars, do about it?  What is in 
our capacity to do?  And what is it legitimate for us to try to do?  These are 
not easy questions.  And I'm not sure I can answer.  But at the end I shall try. 
 
 
Then and Now 
 
In many ways the task of enlightenment that falls to us Africanists is less easy 
than it was for our predecessors of fifty and more years ago.  Indeed, perhaps 
in one sense only has it become easier, in that the pop stars have created for 
us an enormous audience for news of Africa, if one that may have little pa-
tience with the hesitantly complex discussion that is the stock-in-trade of aca-
demics.10  We must learn to engage with that audience—dare I say, try to edu-
                                                 
8   Katy Long, ‘The Power of Ignorance: the British media and the construction of hopeless 
Africa, 1964-1994’ (University of Cambridge MPhil in International Studies, 2005). 
9   As pointed out to me by my former student, Madeleine Bunting, now of The Guardian, in 
telephone conversation.  See also Adrian Hamilton, 'The G8's Africa initiative has failed al-
ready', in The Independent (30 June 2005), 29. 
10   See the know-nothing outburst, ‘Let us rebel against poisonous academics and their pre-
posterous claptrap of exclusion’, from the normally sophisticated Robert Fisk in The Inde-
pendent (14 May 2005), 31, in which he railed against such necessary technicalities as 'matri-
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cate it.  Political pop was, I believe, largely a product of the US civil rights 
movement and the Vietnam war, both of which broke in upon the European 
consciousness after the issue of African freedom had been more or less settled.  
In 1959, the year of Macleod's African nightmare, the best European singer, to 
my mind, à mon avis, was Georges Brassens, chansonnier and poet.  His most 
productive year had been 1957, two years earlier, with seventeen new songs 
in a lifetime total of over 160.  He had a wickedly political sense of the absurd 
hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie.  He ridiculed les trois capitaines, too proud to ap-
preciate la pauvre Hélène; scorned les braves gens who feared those who devi-
ated from the path of middle-class respectability to follow une autre route 
qu'eux.  His disreputability was exhilarating to the youngster I was then.  
Nonetheless, Brassens had none of the anger against geo-political injustice 
that inspires some popular music today.  When his songs were sad it was not 
because of Africa but for his lost love.  If I could paraphrase ‘Les Lilas’, writ-
ten in 1957, ‘quand ses chansons chantaient tristes, ce n'était pas à cause des 
tristes tropiques, mais que l'amour n'était pas là.’ . . .11  
 Otherwise—apart from the politicisation of pop, a two-edged sword—
the times have moved against us.  Above all, freedom fighters have become, 
too often, the lords of misrule.  One has only to think of the transmutation of 
Mugabe12 or, from an earlier era, Kwame Nkrumah, Hastings Banda, or Haile 
Selassie.13  Where are our local heroes today, the allies whose cause we could 
champion, like that of the South African National Congress in the 1980s?  Af-
rica’s women have the best claim to that title.  In the press the stories of their 
endurance evoke our wonder and admiration, so much tougher-minded than 
we.  But they are more victim than ally.14  More generally, Africans and their 
friends have become disillusioned with the fruits of freedom, either stony and 
pitiless as in the Sudan and Zimbabwe, or shrivelled into nothing as in Soma-
lia, or utterly corrupted, as in the Congo.  We are not sufficiently alert—a 
point to which I shall return—to the fact that many African states are not en-
tirely incapable of delivering the public goods of societal renewal, as in Sene-
gal, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana or South Africa—if 
                                                                                                               
lineal' as well as, more justifiably, against such jargon as ‘dialogic injuries’ or ‘cognitive con-
structs’. 
11   Georges Brassens (ed. Pierre Saka), Les Chansons d'abord  (Paris, Librairie Générale Fran-
çaise, 1993). 
12   But for Mugabe as heroic class warrior see, John L Moore, Zimbabwe’s Fight to the Finish: 
The Catalyst of the Free Market  (London: Kegan Paul, 2003). 
13   It was a rare African nationalist who in the European imagination went, like Jomo Ken-
yatta, from villain to statesman.  
14   It is striking how soon the western media lost interest in Kenya’s Wangari Maathai, 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004 for her environmental activism. 
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only they permitted the affordable means to tackle the social cancer of HIV-
AIDS. 
 To return to the contrasts between then and now: As students, then, we 
were able to read African leaders—Nyerere, Fanon, Mboya, Senghor—and to 
learn about Africa in wonderfully cheap books such the Penguin Specials, or 
the Penguin African Library with over twenty titles selling at less than 10?? 
(£0.50p), often written by cosmopolitan journalists with long African experi-
ence, such as the Canadian Patrick Keatley of the Manchester Guardian, the 
South African Brian Bunting of the Rand Daily Mail and (Johannesburg) 
Guardian, and Jack Halpern, born in Berlin, editor of the Central African Exam-
iner.15  African novelists also appeared in the equally cheap Heinemann’s Af-
rican Writers Series, which Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart started off in 
1962.  But I want to say more of a lesser-known series.  It addressed both 
European and African students.  Its authors were often white expatriates, 
deeply involved in the adventure of setting up new African universities, an 
enterprise to which I will refer back in my conclusion. 
 This series was Oxford’s ‘Students Library’.  In 1963 I picked up its first 
title, George Bennett’s Kenya: a Political History , for 6 shillings!  Academics 
were not too proud then to write short, simple—but learned—books for a 
student audience, nor did they labour under Research Assessment regime 
that would have construed such true pedagogical service as an act of depart-
mental disloyalty, to be punished by a cut in the state’s funding.  The OUP’s 
public-spirited authors were not only Bennett and Margery Perham at Ox-
ford, but also, from Africa, Bolaji Idowu and Fred Welbourn on African Chris-
tianity, Merrick Posnansky on the distant past and Philip Whitaker on the 
relevance of western political theory to African problems.  Whitaker was on 
the extra-mural staff of Makerere University College—like his better known 
contemporaries in Ghana: Thomas Hodgkin, Dennis Austin and David 
Kimble—the sort of teaching service that stands in urgent need of revival 
now.   
 The enlightenment such people offered was amazing.  They brought 
both African and European audiences into the same historical discourse with, 
for instance, comparisons between African and European nationalisms or by 
discussion of classical Greek solutions to contemporary African problems.  
Plato, so Whitaker argued, was especially relevant to multi-cultural states, for 
he had believed that ‘political society makes differences useful and construc-
tive, rather than a nuisance.’  Aristotle, too, thought states facilitated differ-
ence and specialisation among political animals, as modern East Africans 
                                                 
15   Authors, respectively, of The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland  (1963), The Rise of the South African Reich (1964), and South Africa’s Hostages: Basuto-
land, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland  (1965). 
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were, no less than ancient Greeks.  Writing for an increasingly Christian Afri-
can audience, Whitaker also pulled St Paul into his argument for diversity.  
Paul, he wrote, ‘was most proud of being a Roman citizen, but he was very 
proud of being a Jew and a Greek.  As a Roman, he was able to be all three at 
the same time;’ and Whitaker again drew the Platonic lesson for today: ‘The 
properly-run state gains its strength from the very fact that the people within 
it are all different. . .  Only a wise political system can turn the great tribal and 
racial differences which exist in East Africa to a good and useful purpose.’16 
 And now?  Which Africans can our students now read in cheap editions?  
Mandela’s Long Walk to Freedom is the only recent autobiography that comes 
to mind.  And what has become of the Penguin Specials?  Or of the ‘Student’s 
Library’?  We must be thankful to James Currey for his African Issues series: 
the sole source, as I believe, of moderately priced but unimpeachably expert 
discussion on contemporary Africa.  Perhaps therefore, since few publishers 
are now interested in Africa, we should be all the more grateful to Geldof and 
Bono, the Penguin Specials of today. 
 It is all the more important that younger Africanists should be aware of 
the precedent set by our predecessors in bringing Africa and Africans to the 
attention of a western public.  Public academic engagement with African is-
sues has a long and intellectually strenuous history.  I can give only a brief 
and insular, trans-Manche, glimpse of what we Europeans have to live up to in 
our own day. 
 
 
Our predecessors in hope 
 
The first modern attempt to educate British voters about African issues that I 
have discovered was in 1929, thirty years before Macleod’s alarm, when the 
Student Christian Movement, based in the Universities, produced an eighty-
page booklet, priced at one shilling, on East Africa in Transition.  This summa-
rised and discussed the 350 pages of a commission of enquiry into the possi-
ble ‘closer union’ of the British territories in Eastern Africa, an issue full of ra-
cial dynamite in a part of Africa where white settler interests competed with 
the principles of ‘native trusteeship’ at the heart of British policy.17  So the 
                                                 
16   Philip Whitaker, Political Theory and East African Problems (London, Ibadan, Nairobi & 
Accra: Oxford University Press, 1964), quotes from pp. 13, 15, 19.  Other series authors were, 
George Bennett, Kenya, a Political History  (1963); Bolaji Idowu, Towards an Indigenous Church 
(1964); F B Welbourn, East African Christian (1965); Margery Perham, African Outline (1966: 
originally four talks on the BBC in 1965); Merrick Posnansky (ed.), Prelude to East African His-
tory  (1966). 
17   East Africa in Transition: Being an Examination of the Principles of the Report of the Hilton 
Young Commission (London: SCM, 1929). 
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precedents go back a long way, even if one ignores the University support for 
the anti-slavery movement and, at the outset of the last century, the Congo re-
form movement.   
 But nearer to my own theme of the need to listen to Africans as equals, 
let me instance Professor Malinowski who, in the late 1930s, hoped to educate 
Europeans, then facing the twin tyrannies of fascism and communism, by 
presenting to a western readership Jomo Kenyatta’s work, Facing Mount 
Kenya.  As a displaced Pole himself, Malinowski believed educated Africans 
experienced the [one, common] ‘tragedy of the modern world in an especially 
acute manner.’18  Contrast this message with that suggested by the title of the 
Commission for Africa’s report.  Malinowski welcomed Kenyatta’s views as 
those of an observant world citizen.  The Commission for Africa’s report is en-
titled Our Common Interest.  Self-interest rules in place of universal tragedy; 
Africa is no longer a prophetic voice but a common concern.  There is much 
more one could tell of our predecessors of more than half a century ago: Of 
the international galaxy of scholars—American, Belgian, British, French, 
German, Italian, Kenyan and South African—who advised Lord Hailey’s Afri-
can Survey (1938);19 of the energy with which they built for the future in 
founding the universities that would give Africans a voice to which the world 
would have to pay heed;20 and of the institutions of civil society that contin-
ued to summarise important official reports21--but there is no time.  Nonethe-
less, I cannot leave that era of hope for Africa without mentioning Margery 
Perham, Oxford’s University Aunt to generations of British colonial cadets.  
At the intellectual centre of the empire, she went to great lengths to bring Af-
ricans into the circle of a common humanity.  To look today at what she did 
then is to make most of us feel rather small. 
                                                 
18   B Malinowski, Introduction’ to Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1938), ix.  With Bruce Berman I have been working, for too long, on an intellectual 
biography of Kenyatta and Louis Leakey. 
19   See, Helen Tilley, ‘Africa as a “Living Laboratory”: the African Research Survey and the 
British Colonial Empire: Consolidating Environmental, Medical, and Anthropological De-
bates, 1920-1940’ (Oxford University DPhil thesis, 2001). 
20   Katya Leney, Decolonisation, Independence, and the Politics of Higher Education in West Af-
rica (Lewiston NY, Queenston Ont, & London: Mellen Press, 2003) for the origins of the Uni-
versities of Legon and Dakar; for East Africa, see Margaret Macpherson, They Built for the Fu-
ture: A Chronicle of Makerere University College (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1964). 
21   See, for example, The Africa Bureau’s fifty-page (3 shillings) The Future of East Africa  
(1955), being a summary of East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report  (London: Cmd 
9475, 1955).  The Nairobi Chamber of Commerce signalled its agreement with most of the 
Report in another fifty-page pamphlet Examination of the East Africa Royal Commission 1953-
1955 Report  (Nairobi, 1956). 
John Lonsdale 
 
386 
In 1936, seventy years ago, Perham edited a collection of biographies, Ten Af-
ricans.  It is extraordinary to read her Introduction today: It makes one’s hair 
stand on end to recognise how much she is our contemporary, even when she 
attributes African anonymity to its easy fit with white racism—something we 
perhaps neglect in analysing popular perceptions of hopeless Africa today.  
Britons, she remarked, accepted as normal what was in truth ‘the peculiar 
condition of empire under which we control the destinies of people we do not 
understand.’  The absence of ordinary social relations between the races, 
‘through which people come to know and like each other’, was, she thought, 
to blame for this misunderstanding.  She went on: 
The main reason for this is the ‘backwardness’ of Africans.  It is an obvious 
and fundamental fact, but one upon which we are apt to lean a little too hard 
in order to make ourselves comfortable in a difficult situation.  In default of true 
knowledge we too often make do with assumptions: the primary one, that 
Africans are backward; next, that they are almost all equally backward; 
even that they are inherently, and so permanently, backward.  Cut off as 
most of us are from any contact with Africans as individuals, we think of 
them or deal with them in the mass;. . .  We see the strange, stupid or cruel 
things they do and, ignorant of their motives, forgetting what we ourselves 
did yesterday, what alas! Christian nations are doing today, think them 
relatively more stupid and cruel than they are.  We allow black skin and 
negro features to shut Africans off from those perceptions which we turn 
upon members of our own race. . .   We see semi-naked peasants living in 
mud huts, satisfying their elementary wants apparently in the most primi-
tive ways.  Surely, we think, people living like that cannot have personality 
as we reckon it!  . . . When, here and there, an African differentiates himself 
from the mass in a way we cannot ignore, he often rouses in us a kind of 
resentment.  Is this, perhaps, because it is troublesome to adjust towards an indi-
vidual an attitude which for our convenience or our prestige we habitually turn 
towards a race?22 
To drive her point home, Perham chose the caption ‘Individuals and Indi-
vidualities’ for the book’s first photograph.  Yet this showed three stereotypi-
cal Africans squatting on the ground in bangles and blankets.23  Who among 
us today could write so simply, so powerfully, so much against the grain of 
popular perception, sadly so similar now to what it was then, despite all the 
television, radio, and press reporting that has shown us extraordinary African 
courage and resilience in the face of suffering, as also the African cruelty that 
has caused so much of it? 
                                                 
22   Margery Perham (ed.), Ten Africans (London: Faber & Faber [1936] 1963), Introduction, 9-
10.  Emphasis added.  I have also transposed her remarks about peasants and individual dif-
ferentiation. 
23   Ibid ., facing page 16. 
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 Margery Perham carried on the work of introducing individual Afrians to the 
world after the Second World War.  In 1946 she found a publisher for and 
wrote an introduction to Obafemi Awolowo’s book, The Path to Nigerian Free-
dom, when he was but a law student.  Ten years later she similarly wrote an 
introduction to the young Tom Mboya’s radical pamphlet, The Kenya Question: 
An African Answer, published by the Fabian Colonial Bureau.  Ten years later 
still she even introduced J M Kariuki’s shocking memoir of what he had suf-
fered at British hands in Mau Mau Detainee.24  Here was a senior academic, one 
of the chief public moralists for imperial trusteeship, actively helping to give 
young Africans a subversive voice at the seat of Empire, and one who could 
write, privately, that Kenyatta was the sort of person with whom one could 
speak without condescension, ‘man to man’.25  
 Scholars at the time had great faith in human agency—perhaps because 
willpower seemed so self-evidently decisive during and after the ordeal of 
world war.  Margaret Wrong, secretary of the international committee for 
Christian literature for Africa, started her book, Five Points for Africa—a plea 
for a new deal for the continent—with the chapter ‘We are Men’, echoing the 
question the Quakers had put to the merchants of slavery.26  Joyce Carey, 
former colonial official and no friend to African nationalism, was nonetheless 
passionate in his call for the sort of African freedom that increased personal 
choice: ‘To leave any man in ignorance, sickness, poverty, or racial contempt, 
without help, is to hold freedom cheap.’  His respect for individual agency led 
Carey to argue, in 1941—when his own country’s freedom was in question—
but in terms which have as strikingly contemporary a ring as Perham’s, that 
‘Africa, already a vast slum among the nations, is growing poorer every day 
and cannot save herself.  She is sinking deeper into wretchedness, disease, 
famine, while the world’s demands upon responsible governments, the 
world’s conscience, become every day more impatient of excuse.’27   
 Melville Herskovits, a founder of African studies in the United States, 
was no less eloquent in the cause of African agency, more cultural than indi-
vidual in his opinion.  To him, colonial rulers were wrong to suppose that 
‘Africans were . . . highly malleable, a people whose destiny it was to be 
                                                 
24   All published in London.  Other details, in sequence: Faber and Faber, 1947; Fabian Co-
lonial Bureau, 1956; Oxford University Press, 1963. 
25   ‘Notes of 10 ix 39’: Rhodes House, Oxford, Perham Papers, MP 451/1. 
26   Margaret Wrong, Five Points for Africa  (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1942).  In 1940 
British churchmen endorsed the five principles laid down by Pope Pius XII in 1937 for 
proper international relations, namely: abolition of extreme inequality; equal educational 
opportunity for all; protection of the family; restoration of a sense of vocation to daily work; 
stewardship of the earth for future generations. 
27   Joyce Carey, The Case for African Freedom (London: Secker and Warburg, [1941] 1944), 
154, 147. 
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mo[u]lded into the image their tutors delineated for them.’  Africans were ‘a 
force in being’, no mere ‘ supplementary resource’.  Nationalism thus restored 
to Africans the creativity of power: ‘Culturally, no less than politically, inde-
pendence made of them free agents.’28 
 How might we in our generation recover a similar sense of purpose and ob-
ligation for ourselves and for Europe, in the cause of an African agency that Af-
rica’s recent history, no less than the popular mood of today, seems to deny? 
 
 
Globalised Apartheid? 
 
What we need, I suggest, is an analogy for what got us angry and active in the 
past.  Would it be too much to compare today’s politically and socially divided 
but economically unified world with the apartheid South Africa of yesterday?  
The parallels are surely very close.  Our immigration and asylum laws operate in 
ways not greatly different to pass laws.  Northern farmers enjoy the same price 
guarantees and export subsidies that used to protect white settlers from black 
peasant competitors.  To an extent that someone as inexpert as myself can only 
guess at, that Africa’s thirteen per cent of the world's population contributes only 
two per cent of the world's commerce is due to unfair terms of trade as well to 
low African productivity.29  But there is little doubt that international oil compa-
nies exploit African resources for very little in return other than the arming of 
African protectors, like the township police of yesteryear.  We recruit skilled Af-
rican workers in the British and, I believe, other European health services.  Their 
‘social reproduction’ costs are borne by poor African states that reap no benefit 
from their trained manpower, just as black South African migrant labour was 
reproduced in the Bantustans, more or less cost-free to its white urban employ-
ers. 
 If that analogy is anywhere near accurate, then might not the precedents 
of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the campaign against British invest-
ment in South Africa, which lasted all of twenty years, also be useful?  They 
are certainly precedents that ought to appeal to universities.  According to 
Mike Terry, formerly executive secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, 
‘anti-apartheid became part of British student culture and economic boycotts 
an accepted norm’.30  One can almost hear an approving grunt from the ghost 
                                                 
28    Melville J Herskovits, The Human Factor in Changing Africa  (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1962), 9, 343. 
29    Cameron Duodu is more certain.  See 'We need to form cartels', The Guardian (29 June 
2005), 21. 
30  In interview with Ms Nerys John, 12 January 1999, quoted in idem , ‘The Campaign 
against British Bank Involvement in Apartheid South Africa’, (MPhil dissertation, University 
of Cambridge, 1999), 41. 
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of Iain Macleod.  AAM also embraced the enthusiasm of the popular music 
world.31 
 I draw another conclusion, which is that African studies stand in great need 
of economists and economic historians who might understand how the hidden 
mysteries of globalisation affect Africa.  Three simple thoughts arise, to prompt 
research into complexity.  First, no one can doubt that Africa stands in great need 
of capital, and the formal relations of production and governance that demand 
the wider distribution of capital’s profits than to its owners alone.  By what 
means capital can thus be ‘socialised’, whether by foreign direct investment or 
by African state-, or co-operative, ownership is surely best argued out between 
Africans.  The second thought raises still thornier issues.  Is it possible that the 
precipitate rise of Chinese textile and other exports will make African labour 
globally redundant, and will thirst for oil and markets make China the newest 
friend to African dictators?  Finally, economists will doubtless never agree on 
how far the fault for Africa’s economic stagnation lies at the door of global struc-
tures or the malign local agency of kleptocratic rulers.  Hitherto our interpreta-
tions of contemporary Africa have paid most heed to changing forms of struc-
tural fate.  Is it perhaps time for a change? 
 
 
Structure and agency in African studies 
 
Africanist scholarship has not always been the most usefully critical friend of 
Africa.  That judgement may be no more than the prejudice of an historian, 
whose instinct is for stories of human agency--about who did what to whom, 
to whose advantage and at whose expense.  Historians, like anthropologists, 
tend to be particularists, snappers up of what sociologists, political scientists 
and economists, all grand generalisers, think to be matters too trifling for their 
consideration.32  Nor are historians best placed to criticise our friends in other 
disciplines, scarcely knowing how to write the history of contemporary Africa 
ourselves.33  But if only the professionally sinless were permitted to cast the 
stones of scholarly criticism we would all be as silent as Africans appear to 
have been made by Live 8. 
 When Richard Fardon invited me to give this talk he only half-jokingly 
supposed that in a single lecture one could not be asked to cover everything 
you ever needed to know about African studies over their first half-century.  I 
agree.  That would be impossible.  So let me try it in two or three paragraphs 
                                                 
31   A point I owe to Shula Marks. 
32   With apologies to Shakespeare’s Autolycus in The Winter’s Tale IV, 2. 
33   Stephen Ellis, ‘Writing histories of contemporary Africa’, Journal of African History  43 
(2002), 1-26. 
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instead.  I shall offend many friends in the attempt.  The burden of my com-
plaint is that we ourselves have tended to create successive single Africas in 
the public mind (insofar as we are read at all) and, moreover, African conti-
nents largely empty of the identifiable, awkward, individual Africans that 
Margery Perham long ago felt made us, or our analyses, uncomfortable.   
 Our single Africas, I suggest, have been represented in a sequence of 
three teleologies, or paradigms, of hope or despair in which the individual 
freedoms that excited a Perham, a Carey, or a Herskovits, have been largely 
absent.  These structuralist teleologies are well enough known to us, which is 
why a few paragraphs are enough.  The first teleology, friendly to African na-
tionalism and the new African nations, was found in the modernisation the-
ory that held sway in the 1950s and 1960s.  This translated the socially mobile 
behaviour that was thought to characterise industrial Atlantic society, with its 
urban anonymity and capitalist rationality (but without its class struggles), to 
an almost entirely pre-industrial, largely rural, scarcely capitalist Africa.  Not 
only was this liberal political theory totally disconnected from the parochial-
isms of African societies,34 it was also strangely empty of human courage and 
ingenuity.  ‘Charisma’ was an analytical category rather than a personal qual-
ity in someone like Nkrumah.  Nationalism, far from being a creative adven-
ture, was a sociological banality, ‘the inevitable end product of the impact of 
Western imperialism and modernity on African societies.’35 
 The second teleology was underdevelopment, modernisation’s dark mir-
ror image.  This approach had many strands, some more vulgarly Marxist 
than others.  Its partisans could not agree on how far Africa had been ex-
ploited by colonial capitalism.  Generalising from Ghana, where at the end of 
British rule three quarters of the population remained self-employed, Kay ar-
gued that Africans had not been exploited enough; their labour had not been 
alienated from their household or artisanal production and driven into more 
rational, large-scale, agriculture or manufacture.36  Wallerstein, a disillusioned 
modernisation theorist on the rebound, argued that very simple forms of pri-
mary production in a periphery such as Africa in any case suited the needs of 
                                                 
34   Here I agree with Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument (Oxford & Bloomington: James Currey & Indiana University Press, 1999), 142, re-
emphasised in their ‘How does Africa Works work? Retour sur une lecture hétérodox du 
politique en Afrique noire’, in Alessandro Triulzi & M Cristina Ercolessi (eds),: State, Power, 
and New Political Actors in Postcolonial Africa  (Milano: Fondazione Feltrinelli, Annali Anno 
Trentottesimo, 2002), 114-19. 
35   David E Apter, The Gold Coast in Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 
chapter 14; James S Coleman, ‘Nationalism in tropical Africa’, American Political Science Re-
view 48 (1954), 426. 
36   Geoffrey Kay, Development and Underdevelopment: a Marxist Analysis (London: Macmillan, 
1975). 
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industrial capital at the core of the world system.37  Structurally, Africa had no 
hope until the socialist world revolution.  But no underdevelopmentalist 
knew how to analyse African social classes and their struggles, a confusion re-
flected in the common use of the term 'petty bourgeoisie', trendy code for an 
analytical blind alley.  Without well defined classes, it was hard to discover 
heroes of class struggle, people who might mobilise a capacity to change 
things, however tight the constraints on their agency.  A truncated teleology 
of paralysed dialectics generated few of the African voices which Perham had 
given us.38 
 The third teleology goes under the name of neo-patrimonialism, al-
though its scholars, too, disagree on the meaning of the term.  In general, 
however, it signifies a fatal conjuncture between one of the past glories of Af-
rican history and its modern nemesis.  In the past free peasantries practised a 
creative resilience in self-governing, stateless, frontier societies.  Nowadays 
political elites patronise the same small communities—‘tribes’-in order to 
press their private demands on the state’s public goods. Clientelism, bound 
by personal codes of honour, is no way to build states that obey a rule of law 
and, without law, states can expect neither investment nor any wide political 
legitimacy.  But strangely, even in analyses of what are quintessentially face-
to-face politics it is rare to meet fully rounded political actors, leaders with the 
personal or political histories that enable us to enter into their own problem-
atic gambles on future survival.  There are methodological difficulties of 
course.  African rulers do not welcome intimate enquiries; their private pa-
pers are not yet available.  Nonetheless there is a curiously mechanical quality 
to our analyses of the intricately personal politics of neo-patrimonialism.  The 
logic is too inexorable.  The spoils systems of 'blackmail states', it is held, first 
pillage public institutions to feed clients’ loyalty, become ever more destruc-
                                                 
37   For his recantation see, Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Modernization: requiescat in pace’, chap-
ter 7 in idem, The Capitalist World-Economy (London & New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979), 132-7. 
38   For exceptions to this anonymity of class actors see, in an arbitrary selection: Richard 
Jeffries, Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: the Railwaymen of Sekondi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), for trade unionist Pobee Biney; Frederick Cooper, On the African Wa-
terfront: Urban Disorder and the Transformation of Work in Colonial Mombasa (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 1987) for Chege Kibachia and Tom Mboya, trade unionists 
too; Kenneth King, Jua Kali Kenya: Change & Development in an Informal Economy, 1970-95 
(London, Nairobi & Athens OH: Currey, EAEP & Ohio University Press, 1996), for self-made 
entrepreneurs Peter Kagotho and others; David K Leonard, African Successes: Four Public 
Managers of Kenyan Rural Development (Berkeley, Los Angeles & Oxford: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1991) for Simeon Nyachae and other creative officials among the derided bu-
reaucratic bourgeoisie; and above all, for a tragic hero of the petty bourgeoisie, Charles van 
Onselen, The Seed is Mine: The Life of Kas Maine, a South African Sharecropper, 1894-1985 (Cape 
Town & New York: David Philip and Hill & Wang, 1996). 
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tive as the competition to 'eat' devours the economy so that, finally, warlord-
ism, government by civil war, becomes a fate from which only external inter-
vention can rescue Africa.39  If salvation lies, as it must, in a politics produc-
tive of public goods then it seems that internal African structures must indeed 
baffle all but heroic external agency, such as one might look for from the man 
on a white horse.  To that logic there are two objections.  One is that it invites 
one to accept what is at best questionable—that international non-
governmental agencies can resolve problems of governance when it often ap-
pears, to the contrary, that they absolve African governments of the necessity 
to tackle them.40  The second is that not all African states have followed the 
same downward path to its inevitable end.  Some have contrived to pull 
themselves up short of self-destruction. 
 All three analyses of modern Africa have shared a basic weakness, their 
lack of historical depth.  Without such depth it is difficult to see how African 
states have developed differently from one another, as they have, over the last 
half century.  Not enough work has yet been done to show how different so-
cial histories of, and political arguments within, nationalisms emerged within 
different sorts of colony, or how such nationalisms then tried to shape differ-
ent purposes for independence.  And there has been too little elaboration of 
Allen’s insight that postcolonial regimes reacted in contrasting ways to their 
initial crises of governance, their ‘crises of clientelism’.41  Many failed to mend 
their ways; some placed some curbs on their tendency to self-destruction.  
This divergence in postcolonial history must have something to do with the 
exercise of agency by political leaders, or their failure to exercise it.  The social 
sciences seem structurally averse to recognising that contingency.42  It is no 
accident that the best brief account of the variety of modern African history 
rests on a balance between structure and agency: ‘Debt was the point at which 
the global economic environment gave way to African policy decisions as the 
chief reason for crisis.’43 
                                                 
39   Again, an arbitrary sample: Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works; Jean-François Bayart, 
Stephen Ellis and Béatrice Hibou, The Criminalization of the State in Africa  (Oxford and Bloom-
ington: Currey and Indiana University Press, 1999); William Reno, Warlord Politics and Afri-
can States (Boulder and London: Rienner, 1998). 
40   Alex de Waal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa  (Oxford and 
Bloomington: Currey and Indiana University Press, 1997). 
41  Chris Allen, ‘Understanding African Politics’, Review of African Political Economy 65 
(1995), 301-20. 
42   See further, John Lonsdale 'Agency in tight corners: narrative and initiative in African 
history', Journal of African Cultural Studies 13, 1 (2001), 5-16. 
43   John Iliffe, Africans: The History of a Continent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 252-70, quote from p. 253. 
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Conclusion: the recovery of African voices 
 
What is to be done?  If the globalisation of apartheid gets anywhere near the 
truth, then global justice must be the goal for our leaders, as I think it was for 
Iain Macleod, prompted by the fear of what Africans might do were justice 
denied.  But we all know the obstacles in the path of such distributive justice: 
the protections demanded by producers in the industrialised world; the secu-
rity priorities of 'the war on terror';44 popular objections to the immigration of 
today's huddled masses; the curse of oil and strategic minerals that converts, 
by a reverse alchemy, the potential gold of capitalism into the certain lead of 
mafiadom; the looming tsunami of Chinese mass production that may turn all 
Africans, like the black farmworkers of apartheid South Africa, into 'surplus 
people'.  Europeans no longer fear African protest—unless they happen to be 
Muslim.  Conversely, and to repeat, there are few African heroes, allies in de-
velopment, not least because African states lack so many of the competitive 
institutional authorities that can, on occasion, call rulers to account. 
 The G8 will set out its compromises.  They will lack the coherence of the 
Commission for Africa’s proposals.  But what can mere academics do to see that 
even compromises are honoured?  Our only power is to educate imaginations.  
But that is potentially enormous, both in what we write and in what we advo-
cate.  To take first our scholarship.  The most powerful goad to action on be-
half of justice is surely a popular imagination that Africans are men and 
women like us, with the will, however constrained by past history, to change 
their societies for the better.45  What Africans perhaps most need from us are 
the biographies that give voice to their reflective, polemical, thoughts.  Alex-
ander McCall Smith may have done more for Africa than all the rest of us, 
with his creation of Mma Precious Ramotswe of Botswana’s No. 1 Ladies’ De-
tective Agency, a woman to keep us spellbound.  Certainly, more people will 
read McCall Smith than, say, J D Y Peel’s account of how Yoruba Christians 
acted with a sense of history as acute as any European’s, or John Iliffe’s pano-
rama of how a culture of honour has stiffened African agency throughout his-
                                                 
44   For which see Sandra T Barnes, ‘Global Flows: Terror, Oil, and Strategic Philanthropy’, 
African Studies Review 48, 1 (2005), 1-22; Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Se-
curitization and Fear’, Alternatives 20 (2005), 55-80. 
45   To echo not only the Quakers of two centuries ago and Margaret Wrong, but also the ti-
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tory, perhaps more so than is prudent for the conduct of modern states.46  But 
the historical perspective that makes biography worth writing, namely, the 
admission that a willed sense of personal purpose may stir up collective ac-
tion, is beginning to colour our analyses at last—just as it inspired, a century 
ago, missionary and African Christian translations of instructive Bible stories, 
with their named heroes and heroines.47  Even economists have started to tell 
the stories of African working lives, to show how much market disadvantage 
is determined by gendered crises.48 
 But Africans, our colleagues especially, need our advocacy as well as our 
learning.  Many will think it unwise, even improper, for scholars to act as ad-
vocates.  Partisanship surely clouds judgment, threatening the dispassionate 
attention to unwelcome evidence that alone confers scientific status on the 
humanities.  To that doubt we may give two confident replies.  The first is 
methodological.  The medievalist Christopher Cheney long ago upheld, beau-
tifully, the essential intimacy of historical—and other social science—research.  
Our sources, he wrote, 'like the little children of long ago, only speak when 
they are spoken to, and they will not talk to strangers.'49  Students of Africa 
have no option but to befriend Africans, past and present.  They will not oth-
erwise speak to us.  Both oral and written sources reveal to their friends, and 
not to strangers, the local polemical arena, the local arguments, that prompted 
them to speak out in their own partisan interest.  Had they not done so they 
would not have caught our outsider’s attention.  Friendship with our sources 
turns out to be the only method to uncover and weigh the many varieties of 
contrary evidence.  Without passionate commitment there can be no dispas-
sionate research.50   
 The second response, in this case, complements methodological passion 
with its opposite, professional disinterest.  For I want to suggest that we 
European Africanists concentrate our public energies on demanding that our 
                                                 
46   J D Y Peel, Religious Encounter and the Making of the Yoruba (Bloomington & Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2000); John Iliffe, Honour in African History  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005). 
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governments support the properly funded, properly protected, rebirth of Af-
rican universities, a matter to which the Commission for Africa paid some, 
but too little, attention.51   
 There would be many benefits.  I will suggest five.  The first—and the proof 
of our disinterest-would be the renewed ability of African scholars, as in the 
1960s and 1970s, to challenge the monopoly on what passes for useful Africanist 
knowledge now held by westerners.  Our colleagues would again be our com-
petitors.  Western leaders, too, would once again hear African voices to which 
they would have to pay heed.  From this all other benefits follow, if Africans be 
enabled to reshape their academies and, in those academies, rethink their socie-
ties, economies, and politics. 
 Second, therefore, one might hope that restored African universities would 
find the energy to rethink Africa’s development needs, since previous efforts 
have been so unsuccessful.  Does Africa, for instance, need fewer civil servant 
graduates and more scientists and technocrats?  Calestous Juma, an expatriate 
Kenyan at Harvard, proposed this at a meeting to discuss how to give effect to 
the Commission for Africa’s recommendations for African higher education.52  
There are already pointers to how higher education might be given a new direc-
tion, better adapted to a knowledge-based world economy, provided that institu-
tions enjoy international support, including a global circulation of teaching staff, 
building on linkages that already exist.53  At the centre of such academic global-
isation must surely be the Atlantic African diaspora of academics and other pro-
fessionals.  To find ways of encouraging Africa’s brain drain to become part of 
Africa’s globally circulating brain gain is the key to a more knowledgeable fu-
ture.  Might not a suitably extended Association of Commonwealth Universities 
take this on as its next task? 
 Science and technology are essential, but to what social end?  What Afri-
can universities need as much as scientists, thirdly, are moral and political 
philosophers.  The main western pressure group on the G8 went by the collec-
tive name ‘Make Poverty History’.  This is a very modern aspiration, even in 
Europe, springing from the same eighteenth-century enlightenment that 
roused the Quakers to demand the abolition of the slave trade.  Tom Paine 
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and Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet were the first to propose that mass pov-
erty could be eradicated rather than merely contained by poor laws and miti-
gated by charity.  Both men were disowned by the revolutions they helped to 
inspire.  And public policy to eradicate poverty had to await a Bismarck in the 
nineteenth century or a Beveridge in the twentieth.54  Africans have not yet 
thought through a similar revolution in public morality for themselves.  That 
is another and, to judge by the European precedent, a distant and difficult as-
piration to offer to public thinkers in African universities.  
 Social reform has little appeal without a robust economy.  Fourthly, 
therefore, reinvigorated African universities will have a related, even more 
difficult problem to think out: How can self-employed, under-capitalised 
peasants with penny packets of non-uniform products compete for the su-
permarket trade with the plantations of Brazil, Australia or Malaysia?  BBC 
Television asked that question in June 2005 with a film that contrasted the 
poverty of a Ghanaian oil-palm grower and his hoe with the comfort of a Ma-
laysian planter on his tractor.  West Africans have paid a heavy price for the 
success of their peasant exporters in the early colonial period, and their hostil-
ity to European-owned plantations.  The British doctrine of ‘native trustee-
ship’ was too nervous of the turmoil that might accompany capitalist exploita-
tion to act ruthlessly in what hindsight suggests was the longterm interest of 
post-colonial peoples.55  A resolute optimism of the peasant will, essential 
though it be to endure climatic caprice, cannot compete with capitalised pro-
duction elsewhere.  Moreover, global warming is predicted to make African 
farming still more uncertain.56 
 But again, economics is not enough.  Productive effort needs confidence 
in the future.  Nowadays only politics can provide that.  And rational bureau-
cratic politics, held to account by democratic institutions of collective opinion, 
is the least worst option.  Clientelist states with sticky fingers cannot provide 
confidence for all, only the despairing illusion of safety for the factional few.  
The final, most difficult and dangerous task for any restored African universi-
ties must be to help revivify public spheres of political discourse, against the 
will of rulers unaccustomed to any authority competitive with their own.  
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American political scientists are even more insistent than we Europeans in 
demanding the necessary measures of African political reform.57 
 The critical public voices I envisage will need to be protected, to be 
properly paid, with international standards of information and research infra-
structures, within properly ‘statish’, Weberian, African states.  This is a tall 
order.  But what is the alternative?  All African states must be encouraged to 
submit to the self-disciplines undertaken by the few that have avoided the 
depths of ‘clientelist crisis’.  African states are already subject to many exter-
nal conditionalities, each a derogation from sovereignty.  That is the price to 
be paid for the loss of fiscal connection between domestic production and 
public revenues, the price of surviving, sometimes up to the level of half of a 
government’s revenue, on aid remittances from overseas.  So let me suggest 
another conditionality, one that is as likely as any other to help Africans get 
off their knees and on to their feet.  Is there not a case for insisting on an 
‘Academic Rights Watch’ conducted by some international body, of which the 
Association of African Universities would be a foundational element?  Might 
that not be a condition for all educational aid?  Is this the one simple point 
that academics might fasten on when considering a goal for our political 
activism? 
 But how, finally, might we as Africanists equip ourselves for such public 
advocacy?  In our own national academies we are weak, as disregarded as 
church mice.  Our individual national research assets in Africa are puny.  But 
could we not turn these separate weaknesses into the beginnings of a collec-
tive strength?  Might not all the European Africanists in AEGIS try to forge, 
from within our national research funding councils, an ‘ever closer union’ of 
our research activity in Africa, a sort of ‘politique européenne par le bas’ that 
would be a model for what we all want as much as a new Africa, namely, a 
Europe of the nations rather than a top-down, Bonapartist Europe of the 
states?  And might we not signal our intent by resurrecting something like the 
old Oxford ‘Student’s Library’?  And might not its first title be a summary, 
eighty-page, discussion of the 460 pages of the Commission for Africa, priced 
at two euros or less?  Who among us would volunteer for that task?  And who 
would translate the summary into French?  German?  Italian?  Spanish?  Or 
into Amharic, Swahili, Fulbe or Kikongo? 
 How many of us, the younger ones especially, will be able to look back, 
thirty years hence and say, as Basil Davidson said to me in 1998, looking back 
on his activist journalism of the 1960s when he mixed with so many Africans, 
                                                 
57   I am grateful to Richard Joseph, director of the Program of African Studies at North-
western University, for feeding me with much material.  See, especially his ‘Institution-
Building and Development in Africa’, Global Dialogue (Sept 2004), and ‘Smart Aid for Africa: 
a statement from the Northwestern University conference on “Aid, Governance and Devel-
opment in Africa”, 12-14th May 2005: http// www.northwestern.edu/african-studies. 
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man to man: ‘The names come faltering back, and the dramas associated with 
them. . . .  and I am repeatedly made grateful to have lived though those tre-
mendous years’?58  The answer to my question is entirely up to you! 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Warum sehen die meisten Europäer ’Afrika’ als ein hilfloses Opfer und ’den Wes-
ten’ als einen Rettungsdienst? Inwieweit sind Afrikanisten für diese Missinterpre-
tation verantwortlich? Wie können wir dafür Sorge tragen, dass EU und G8 auf 
die Vorschläge der Commision for Africa reagieren? Inwieweit können wir auf un-
sere Vorgänger zurückblicken, um von ihnen zu lernen, wie man nicht Europa 
dazu drängt ’etwas zu machen’, sondern den Afrikanern eine bessere Chance gibt, 
sich selbst zu helfen? Inwieweit könnten unsere eigenen Analysen der afrikani-
schen Gesellschaften, Ökonomien und Politiken besser auf die Beantwortung der 
Fragen ausgerichtet werden, wie afrikanische Kräfte lokale und globale Struktu-
ren von Ungleichheit, Ungerechtigkeit und schlechtes Regieren bekämpfen könn-
ten? Und schlussendlich, wie können wir unseren afrikanischen Akademikerkol-
legen am besten dabei behilflich sein, dass sie zu Quellen von konstruktiver, in-
terner Kritik werden? 
 
Schlagwörter 
Afrika, Unterentwicklung, Entwicklungspotential, Entwicklungstheorie, Afrikaforschung, 
Wissenschaftler/ Forscher, Europäer, Fremdbild, Bewusstseinsbildung 
 
 
 
Résumé 
 
Pourquoi la plupart des Européens voient-ils l’Afrique comme une pauvre victime 
irresponsable, et ’l’Ouest’ comme un service de secours ? À quel point les africa-
nistes sont-ils responsables de cette fausse perception ? Comment pouvons-nous 
veiller à ce que l’UE et le G8 réagissent aux propositions publiées par la Commis-
sion for Africa ? Dans quelle mesure pouvons-nous tirer des leçons de nos prédé-
cesseurs non pas pour presser l’Europe ’à faire quelque chose’, mais pour que les 
Africains aient la possibilité de s’aider eux-même ? Jusqu’à quel point nos propres 
analyses des sociétés, économies et politiques africaines peuvent-elles être mieux 
adaptées pour être à même d’expliquer comment les pouvoirs africains pourraient 
combattre les structures locales et globales de l’inégalité, de l’iniquité et du mau-
vais gouvernement ? Et finalement, comment pouvons-nous aider nos collègues 
africains à devenir des sources de critique interne et constructive ? 
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Mots clés 
Afrique, sous-développement, potentiel de développement, théorie du développement, étu-
des africaines, sercheurs/savants, européens, image de l'étranger, prise de conscience 
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